000			01609nam a22001817a 4500
008			221115b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9781137298447 - hbk
100			_aSchofield, Julian
245			_aStrategic nuclear sharing
260			_aBasingstoke : _bPalgrave Macmillan, _c2014
300			_aix, 208p. _bincludes references & index
440			_a Global issues series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm))
520			_aMost nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India
650			_a1. Nuclear weapons Government policy
650			_a2. Nuclear weapons (International law)
650			_a3. Arms negotiation & control
942			_cBK
999			_c8831 _d8831